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DIVISIONS OF JOINT AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DIVISIONS OF JOINTLY OWNED AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY INCIDENT TO DIVORCE
Since the decision in United States v. Davis, it has been settled that a
transfer of property from spouse to spouse incident to divorce is a taxable
sale or exchange. A division of jointly owned or community property between divorcing spouses may or may not be subject to taxation. This note
discusses the types of divisions that are considered taxable events and
2
describes some techniques for avoiding or minimizing the tax.
THE IMPACT OF United States v. Davis

The taxpayer in United States v. Davis transferred appreciated stock to
his wife pursuant to a property settlement agreement incorporated in a
decree of divorce. Prior to the divorce the stock was owned by the taxpayer
alone but was subject to certain inchoate marital rights of his wife under
the law of his domicile, Delaware. The wife had a right to take a portion
of the husband's property under the Delaware intestate succession statute
if she survived him and had a right upon divorce to a reasonable share of
the husband's property. In exchange for the transfer of the stock to her,
the wife relinquished all her rights to taxpayer's property. The Supreme
Court viewed the case as raising two issues: whether the transfer was an
appropriate occasion for taxing the appreciation in the stock and, if so,
how the gain should be measured.
The Court stated that congressional intent to tax the appreciation at
some time was clear. It found sections 1001 and 1002 of the Internal Revenue
Code3 too general to offer significant guidance as to whether the transfer
incident to divorce was the proper occasion to tax the appreciation, and it
looked to other, more settled situations for an analogy. The taxpayer argued
that the transfer was encompassed by the rule that a division of property
between co-owners is not a sale or exchange and hence not an occasion for
recognition of gain or loss. The Government asserted that the transaction
more nearly resembled a taxable transfer of property in exchange for the
release of an independent legal obligation. For example, it is a wellrecognized rule that a transfer of property in satisfaction of a debt in a
liquidated amount is a sale or exchange. The Court adopted the Govern1. 370 U.S. 65, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 9509 (1962).
2. Losses may also occur. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §267 may be an obstacle to deduction
of these losses, depending upon the time the transfer is deemed to occur. If the transfer
takes place after divorce, the parties are no longer related and §267 does not apply. If
the transfer is deemed to occur before the divorce, the parties are related and §267 applies.
If the transfer is deemed to occur at the moment of divorce, the parties are neither related
nor unrelated. The policy of §267 is to prevent collusive transfers between taxpayers who
are related both before and after the transaction. Neither of these elements is present in
the usual divorce setting; consequently, §267 should not apply. In any event, the loss could
be'realized before divorce by sale to an unrelated third party, thus eliminating the §267
obstacle. See Worthy W. McKinney, 64 T.C. No. 25 (1975).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§1001, 1002.
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ment's position, finding the premise of the taxpayer's argument, co-ownership, to be inapt: "[T]he inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's
property by the Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity ot
co-ownership."4

The gain realized in a sale or exchange is measured by the amount realized
in the transaction less the basis of the property transferred5 The amount
realized is the amount of money plus the fair market value of other property
received.6 The Court held the consideration received by the husband, a release of his wife's marital rights, to be equal in value to the property
transferred. His gain was computed as the value of the property transferred
less its basis to him. The Court stated: "[T]he parties acted at arm's length
and .. .they judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the property

for which they were exchanged." 7 It continued: "Absent a readily ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold .. .
that values 'of the two properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction
are either equal in fact, or presumed to be equal.'-8 The Court considered
unacceptable the notion that the transfer should be deemed not taxable
merely because the amount of gain could not be determined with precision.
"[]t is more consistent with the general purpose and scheme of the taxing
statutes to make a rough approximation of the gain realized thereby than
to ignore altogether its tax consequences." 9
The decision in Davis did not foreclose tax-free property settlements. It
recognized that a division of property among co-owners proportionate to
their interests is not a sale or exchange. If the stock transferred by the taxpayer in the Davis case had been owned jointly by the spouses, no tax would
have been generated. The nature of the property interests of the spouses
before divorce is of primary importance in determining the taxability of a
division, and the form of ownership as defined by state law is the deciding
factor.
THE ROLE OF STATE LAW

Co-ownership of property by husband and wife can arise by consensual
act of the parties, as when they take property as joint tenants or as tenants
in common, or by operation of law, as when property is subject to community
property laws. Neither the forms of co-ownership traditionally recognized by
the common law, joint tenancy and tenancy in common, nor community
property has caused much difficulty in applying the Davis rule: a proportionate division of property held in these forms is a division of property between
co-owners and not a taxable sale or exchange. More troublesome have been
4. United States v. Davis. 370 U.S. 65, 70, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 19509, at 85,124 (1962).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1001(a).
6. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1001(b).
7. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 9509, at 85,125 (1962).
8. Id., quoting Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189

(Ct. Cl. 1954).
9. Id.
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the contentions of several divorced taxpayers that the laws of their states of
residence establish marital rights in separately owned property that, although
not labeled community property rights, are nevertheless a form of co-ownership.
Generally, state law determines the rights of parties in property and
federal law determines the tax significance of transactions affecting such
rights. A decision by the state's highest court controls the nature of the
interest for federal tax purposes. 10
Collins v. Commissioner" illustrated both the difficulty of establishing the
nature of an interest under state law and the determinative force of a state
decision interpreting property rights. The taxpayer, a resident of Oklahoma,
a common law state, transferred appreciated stock to his wife pursuant to
a property settlement agreement. Some of the stock was owned by him prior
to marriage; the rest was acquired during marriage by inheritance and as
stock dividends. He argued that Oklahoma law' 2 gave his wife a vested interest
in the stock and that the transfer was a nontaxable division of co-owned
property. The Commissioner disagreed, asserting that the Oklahoma statute
did not create marital rights having the characteristics traditionally associated
with co-ownership. Specifically, he contended that co-ownership is present
only if a descendible interest exists prior to divorce, if the wife can prevent
her husband's disposition of property prior to divorce, and if there is a
claim to a fixed percentage of the property. Because the Oklahoma statutes
granted no such rights, the Commissioner concluded that the transfer was
taxable.
In its initial decision 3 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the Commissioner: "Whatever the nature of the rights granted. ..
it is clear that they do not include the traditional ownership rights in property.
These rights . . . are set out by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Davis. .. ,4 However, the Oklahoma supreme court, in a- case involving
state tax liabilities of the same taxpayer, construed Oklahoma law as giving
spouses marital rights "similar in conception to community property .. .as
species of common ownership."' 5 Thereafter the Tenth Circuit, on remand
of the federal tax case from the Supreme Court, 6 held the transfer to be a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.' 7 The highest court of
10. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 1967-2 U.S.T.C. 12,472 (1967).
11. 412 F.2d 211, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9471 (10th Cir. 1969).
12. 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1278 (1974) provides: "[A]s to such property whether
real or personal . . . acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the
title thereto be in either or both of said parties, the court shall make such division between
the parties respectively as may appear just and reasonable, by a division of the property
in kind, or by setting the same apart to one of the parties, and requiring the other
thereof to pay such sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair and just division
thereof."
13. Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9142 (10th Cir. 1968).
14. Id. at 357, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9142, at 86,145 (10th Cir. 1968).
15. Collins v. Tax Comm'r, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
16. Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215, 1968-2 U.S.T.C. 9666 (1968).
17. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211, 212, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9471, at 85,125 (10th
Cir. 1969).
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the state had determined the nature of the transfer, and the court felt compelled tinder Davis to follow that interpretation. The Commissioner argued
that Davis established federal criteria of co-ownership and that such criteria,
not state labels, should govern federal tax consequences. The Court did not
agree. Flatly rejecting the notion of federal criteria, it stated: "There is no
need to search state law for indications of other factors that might signify
the nature of the wife's property interest."' 8
A federal district court, in Imel v. United States,19 found that Colorado
law also created a species of co-ownership between husband and wife. The
taxpayer, a Colorado resident, transferred appreciated stock to his wife pursuant to a property settlement in divorce. He contended that the transfer
was a division of co-owned property. As in Collins, the traditional characteristics of co-ownership were absent. Rather than construe the state statutes,2 0
the federal district court certified the question of common ownership to the
Colorado supreme court. The Colorado court ruled that, at the time the
divorce action was filed, there vested in the wife an interest in the property
held in the name of the husband and that "the transfer ... was a recognition
of a 'species of common ownership' . . . resembling a division of property
between co-owners." 21 The district court then held the transaction to be a
22
nontaxable division between co-owners.
The correctness of the Imel and Collins decisions is doubtful. The question first certified to the Colorado supreme court in Imel was misstated: "[I]s
the transfer a taxable event for purposes of federal income taxation?" 23 The
determination of federal tax consequences obviously is not a matter to be
certified to state courts. The question was later submitted using different
language: "[I]s such a transfer a recognition of a 'species of common ownership' . . . ?"24 This too may have been defective. State law should be looked
to for a definition of the nature and extent of property rights of the spouses,
but federal law should determine whether that bundle of rights constitutes
co-ownership for purposes of the tax rule allowing co-owners to divide their
property without recognizing gain. "Co-ownership" is not a term of art
borrowed from the common law. It is a word chosen by the Supreme Court
to characterize certain forms of property ownership created by state law.
Whether a form of ownership fits within the class the Supreme Court denominated "co-ownership" is a federal, not a state, question. The Colorado
supreme court placed the common ownership label on rights created by
Colorado law, and the district court in Imel blindly accepted that label as
controlling. The federal court in Collins also accepted a label applied by a
18.
19.

20.

Id.
375 F. Supp. 1102, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. f19617 (D. Colo. 1973).
3 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §46-1-5 (1973).
In re Questions Submitted by the United States Dist. Court, 517 P.2d 1331

(Colo.
21.
1974).
22. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp 1117 (D. Colo. 1974) (Supp. Opinion).
23. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1116, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9617, at 81,996 (D.
Colo. 1973).
24. Id.
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state court without asking whether the marital rights created by Oklahoma
law were encompassed by the Supreme Court's definition of "co-ownership."
The Collins court erred in holding that the meaning of the word "co-ownership" is a state rather than a federal question.
Imel raises another problem. The answer given by the Colorado court
to the certification indicates that the "species of common ownership" created
by its law vested "at the time the divorce action was filed. '25 Davis held that
a transfer from husband to wife at the time of divorce, whether by agreement or process of law, was a taxable sale or exchange. The opinion certainly cannot mean there is no such sale or exchange if the transfer from husband
to wife occurs when the action is commenced rather than when judgment is
entered. Placing the time of transfer at an earlier point merely accelerates
the time for payment of the tax; it does not avoid the tax.
In Wiles v. Commissioner2" the Tenth Circuit again faced the question
under a Kansas statute similar to that of Oklahoma. Under Kansas law- the
parties' property was to be marshalled, regardless of ownership or acquisition,
and divided in a just and equitable manner. The division was wholly within
the discretion of the trial court, with such factors as age, need, and health
2
bearing upon the ultimate awardY.
In concluding that co-ownership did
not exist, the court stated: "These factors are inconsistent with the idea of
co-owned property."28 The approach is more rational than searching state
decisions for labels cast upon these rights; however, no Kansas supreme court
decision on the issue was before the court. The court indicated that it might
not be in agreement with the Imel decision and revealed some doubt about
the correctness of its own decision in Collins.29 The meaning of these
references is unclear, but it may be that in the future the court will place
its own label on the rights defined by the states rather than adhere to its
earlier pronouncements in Collins that "there is no need to search state
law for indication of other factors that might signify the nature of the wife's
property interest." -9
DvISIONS OF CO-OWNED PROPERTY

When a property settlement takes the form of a division in kind, the
division can be proportionate or disproportionate. A division is proportionate
if it is strictly in accord with the parties' respective interests before the
divorce. For example, if a party has a fifty percent interest in an asset before
divorce, then he will receive half that property in a proportionate division.
In a disproportionate division, each party receives a greater or lesser interest
25. In re Questions Submitted by the United States Dist. Court, 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo.
1974).
26. 499 F.2d 255, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9530 (1oth Cir. 1974).
27. 4 KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-1610(b)(c) (1974).
28. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 258, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 19530, at 84,647 (10th
Cir. 1974).
29. Id. at 258, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9530, at 84,648.
30. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211, 212, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9471 at 85,125 (10th
Cir. 1969).
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than he had before the division. An award to a wife of the entire interest
in a house owned by husband and wife as joint tenants prior to divorce is
3 1

an example.

Proportionate divisions are nontaxable events. No sale or exchange occurs
and no gain or loss is realized. Disproportionate divisions are taxable, since
one party receives property he did not previously own in exchange for
other property or the release of a marital right.3 2 If the property has ap-

preciated, the person giving up all or part of this proportionate interest is
deemed to have made a transfer in exchange for a relinquishment of a marital
right, and gain is recognized under Davis. Assume that a community or jointly-owned asset, such as the house discussed above, with a basis of S50,000 and
a fair market value of $100,000, is awarded entirely to the wife in a property
settlement. The husband would have $25,000 of gain computed as follows:
Amount realized
Basis
Gain

-

$50,000 (Value of interest transferred)
25,000 (Basis to husband of interest transferred)
525,000
Equal Value Rule

Suppose joint or community property comprises several assets and each
asset is divided disproportionately, but each party receives, in the aggregate,
assets of a value equal to the value of his interests before divorce. If the
transaction is viewed strictly, the disproportionate division of individual
assets could be considered sales or exchanges. Yet the transaction as a whole
has many of the characteristics of proportionate division of one asset and
the same result - nontaxable partition - should follow. The latter view, called
33
the "equal value" rule, has been adopted by the Service.
To illustrate the "equal value" rule, assume two assets are owned jointly,
a house with a basis of $30,000 and fair market value of $60,000 and farmland with basis and fair market value of $20,000 and $60,000 respectively.
If upon divorce the husband is awarded the farmland and the wife is awarded
the house, no gain or loss is realized by either spouse. The co-ownership
rule applies because, in gross, the division reflects the pre-divorce interests
of the parties in both assets.
When the "equal value" rule applies, each party apparently takes as
his basis for each asset the full basis that the co-owners previously had in the
asset.3 4 In the example used in the preceding paragraph, the husband would

have a basis in the farmland of $20,000 and the wife would have a basis
in the house of $30,000. It might seem more equitable to aggregate the basis
31. If the house were held by tenants in the entirety, the division would have to take
into account the life expectancies of the parties to arrive at the value of the parties'
respective interests. Division in accordance with such valuation would be proportionate.
32. Gift treatment was foreclosed by the Davis decision, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6, 1962-2

U.S.T.C. 9509, at 85, 123-24 (1962).
33. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 6.
34. See C.C. Rouse v. Commissioner, 6 T.G. 908, 914 (1946).
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of the assets and to allocate one-half that total basis to the asset awarded
each spouse. This approach, however, would assign an increased basis to a
depreciable asset and a basis of less than value to any cash received. 35 To
illustrate, assume that a depreciable asset with a basis of $30,000 and a
value of $60,000 and a cash balance in a bank account of $60,000 are held
in joint tenancy and that the wife receives the cash while the husband receives the depreciable asset. The aggregate approach would assign a basis
of $45,000 to the cash and $45,000 to the depreciable asset, as follows:
Basis in cash
$60,000
Basis in depreciable asset
30,000
Total Basis
One-half total basis
Basis to husband in depreciable asset
Basis to wife in cash

$90,000
$45,000
$45,000

$45,000

The Service certainly would not accept an increased basis in the depreciable
property without recognition of gain; yet under the equal value rule no
gain is recognized. Nor may cash have a basis of less than its face value.
DisproportionateDivisions under the Equal Value Rule
When joint or community property is divided disproportionately with
respect to each asset and to gross value, the principle of Davis requires sale
or exchange treatment. But if some co-owned assets are received by each
party, how is the gain to be measured?
In Revenue Ruling 74-347,36 the Service concluded that the equal value
rule governs to the extent of the value of the property awarded the transferor;
as to the excess amounts transferred, the gain is measured in gross. The ruling
also provides a formula for computing the basis of the excess property
transferred, thereby facilitating a computation of the gain to the transferor.
The phrase "excess property" refers to the amount by which the value of
the transferor's interest in the co-owned property before division exceeds
the value of his interest in such property after division. If a husband has
a fifty percent interest in stock worth $100,000 before division, and after
division he owns stock worth $10,000, the excess property transferred is
$40,000, measured as follows:
50 percent of $100,000 = $50,000
-10,000
$40,000

(pre-divorce interest)
(amount retained)
(excess value transferred)

The husband's basis in this excess is computed by using the following formula:

35. Glickfield, Rabow & Schwartz, FederalIncome Tax Consequences of Marital Property
Settlements, U. So. CAL. 1974 TAx INsr. 307.
36. 1974-2 CUm. BULL. 6.
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owned property received by the wife

[Vol. XXVII

Adjusted basis of all
X jointly owned
property received
by the wife

In this example, if the basis in the stock before divorce was $50,000, the
adjusted basis of the property awarded to the wife would be $45,000 (90 percent of $50,000) and the husband's basis in the excess property would be
$20,000:
$40,000
$40,000 x $45,000 - $20,000
$90,000

The husband's taxable gain would be $20,000:
$40,000 (amount realized by husband in transfer of excess)
-20,000 (basis in excess)
$20,000 (gain)
The ruling does not indicate how the basis in the property after the
exchange is determined. Presumably, the wife retains half the original basis
in the portion of property not in excess of her pre-divorce share. The excess
property received should take a cost basis equal to fair market value. 37 The
value of the marital rights given up in exchange for the excess property (the
cost of the excess property received) is deemed equal to the value of the
property received.3 8 The husband's basis in the portion retained is his
original share of basis less the portion assigned to the excess transferred.
Recapture of Investment Credit and Depreciation
under the Equal Value Rule
Sections 1245 and 1250 of the Internal Revenue Code require that certain
amounts be recognized as ordinary income on the disposition of depreciable
property. Section 47 requires that in certain instances, investment credits be
recaptured when the property with respect to which the credit was claimed is
disposed of. If such property is owned jointly or in community by a husband
and wife, the question arises whether the division of the asset incident to
a divorce is a disposition. The answer depends upon the quantitative and
qualitative nature of the division.
If each asset is divided proportionately in kind, no sale or exchange
occurs and no gain is realized or recognized.39 Recapture should not be
required since there is no disposition of any interest in property. The same
result should follow when gross assets, but not individual assets, are divided
equally and one party receives a disproportionate share of the depreciable
37. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 63.
38. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 73, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 19509, at 85,125 (1962).
39.

A change in the form of doing business, such as a change in the form of title, is

not a disposition. Frank R. Harnmerstrom, 60 T.C. 167 (1973).
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or investment credit property. Under the equal value rule no sale or exchange
is deemed to occur. It is only a short jump to the conclusion that there is
no disposition for purposes of the recapture rules. Each party takes as his
basis in each asset received the basis of the asset prior to division, and the
potential for recapture is preserved. 40 Even in instances where a disposition
clearly occurs, the statute generally does not require recapture where the
41
transferor's basis carries over to the transferee.
If the jointly held or community assets are divided so that gain is
recognized, recapture will occur to the extent excess property transferred is
recapture property. Because the transferee takes a fair market value basis
in the excess property, recapture potential is lost in the transfer. Difficult
tracing problems will be encountered if the settlement agreement fails to
identify the assets constituting the excess property. The Service may assume
the excess is composed of depreciable and recapture assets to the extent they
were received by the transferee. It is more likely, however, that the excess
would be considered to include such assets only in the proportion their fair
2
market value bears to the fair market value of all assets transferred4
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Planning devices are difficult to discuss in general terms because their
effectiveness depends upon the value, basis, type, and ownership of the assets
involved. Nevertheless, certain considerations with relatively broad application deserve mention.
Parties have the opportunity to set the value of their assets in a property
40. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §1245(a)(2) provides for a carryover of a recomputed
basis to the taxpayer on account of deductions allowed to the taxpayer or "to any other
person." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1245(a)(1) employs the concept of recomputed basis
to measure the amount of gain that will be recognized as ordinary income. Therefore, if
recomputed basis remains the same, potential recapture is preserved.
41. See INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§47(b), 736, 751, 1245(b)(3), (4), 1250(d)(3), (4). These
sections provide certain exceptions to recapture. Generally, they relate to transactions afforded
tax free treatment by other sections of the Internal Revenue Code that, with related provisions, require carryover of basis and tax attributes. The purpose of these exceptions is
to defer recapture when recognition is deferred and when basis in. the hands of the
transferee taxpayer is determined by reference to basis in the hands of the transferor.
42. Without identification, it cannot be determined which assets were retained and
which were transferred. Although Rev. Rul. 74,347, 1974 Cum. BULL. 6, provides a means
(f determining the amount of gain, it does not provide a means of determining the
character of that gain. TREAs. REG. §1.1245-1(a)(5) provides a means of allocating the
amount realized to §1245 and non-§1245 assets sold or exchanged whether or not an agreement is present. TREAs. REG. §§1.1245-4(c)(1), (2) provide for allocating the amount realized
to §1245 and non-§1245 property in a transaction that is partially tax free. Although the
transactions listed in TREAs. Rxgc. §1.1245-4(c)(2) do not include transfers incident to divorce,
they are premised upon transfers in which basis is carried over (adjusted by gain recognized).
Both of these regulations provide for allocation according to relative fair market values
of the §1245 and non-§1245 property. Because the transfer in the hypothetical situation
posed is partially tax free with carryover of basis, in the absence of an agreement the
amount realized should be allocated similarly,. i.e., according to the relative fair market
values of the §1245 and non-§1245 assets owned by the parties..
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settlement agreement. Because the bargaining is presumed to be at arm's
length, it will rarely be upset. 43 This opportunity should not be overlooked,
especially if the parties aie relying on the equal value rule. For any asset,
there is a range of estimated values within which a convenient, yet supportable,
figure can be chosen. Whether a division is equal in gross may depend on
the valuation of the assets awarded to each spouse. Even when the division
is certain to be taxable, the amount of the gain realized will depend upon
asset valuations.
If the division is to be partially disproportionate, low basis assets should
be segregated and divided equally, if possible, so that gain can be minimized
by effecting the disproportionate division with high basis assets. Assume, for
example, a husband and wife each have a 50 percent interest in jointly held
assets and the husband has substantial separate property. The parties agree,
or the court decrees, that the wife shall receive 70 percent of the joint assets.
Gain to the husband may be minimized by dividing equally between the
spouses the 60 percent of the assets with lowest bases and by awarding to the
44
wife complete ownership of the 40 percent with highest bases.
If the joint or community property comprises a single asset owned
equally and is to be divided equally in value, the parties can employ the
equal value rule without dividing the property in kind. By borrowing
against the asset one half its value, distributing the cash to one party, and
distributing the encumbered asset to the other, each of the parties receives
his proportionate share. 45 The same approach can be used if there are
multiple assets that cannot be awarded in such a manner that each party
will receive his proportionate share of the value.
The advisor should be cognizant of the disparities in bases to the respective
parties as a bargaining point, whether or not Davis gain is present. In an
equal division under the equal value rule, the parties will retain the original
basis in each asset, but some assets may have a high basis while others have
a low basis. The party receiving the low basis assets is in effect getting less
property, for upon subsequent sale greater taxable gain will be realized. In
a disproportionate division similar considerations apply, for the transferor
will keep the original basis in the assets retained while the transferee will
take a fair market value basis in the excess joint property received.
CONCLUSION

The decision in Davis has generated uncertainty regarding the taxability
of property settlements in states, such as Oklahoma and Colorado, whose
laws create interspousal rights similar to community property rights. Federal
courts in these jurisdictions have struggled with the concept of federal criteria
of co-ownership but as yet have failed to embrace it. The Collins and
Imel decisions appear to be questionable. If Imel should be overruled, the
intended certainty flowing from the state certification process may be lost.
43.
44.
45.

C. H. Wren, 24 T.C.M. 290, 293 (1965).
Glickfield, Rabow & Schwartz, supra note 34.
Id. at 331.
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In all jurisdictions some unanswered questions remain with regard to
the recognition and character of gain realized when divorcing coowners
effect a disproportionate division of depreciable assets and investment credit
property. The Code provisions and regulations relating to recapture, however, pursue clear policy objectives which support expected tax results in
transactions not specifically dealt with therein.
In any event dilligent planning can reduce the potential tax exposure of
transfers incident to divorce. With a comprehensively drafted property
settlement agreement, the tax consequences of property division can be
determined with substantial certainty where state law is unambiguous as to
pre-divorce ownership.
JAMES ROSEL
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